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In late 2003, Norway passed a law mandating 40 percent representation of each gender on the 
board of publicly limited liability companies. The primary objective of this reform was to 
increase the representation of women in top positions in the corporate sector and decrease gender 
disparity in earnings within that sector. We document that the newly (post-reform) appointed 
female board members were observably more qualified than their female predecessors, and that 
the gender gap in earnings within boards fell substantially.  While the reform may have improved 
the representation of female employees at the very top of the earnings distribution (top 5 highest 
earners) within firms that were mandated to increase female participation on their board, there is 
no evidence that these gains at the very top trickled-down. Moreover the reform had no obvious 
impact on highly qualified women whose qualifications mirror those of board members but who 
were not appointed to boards.  We observe no statistically significant change in the gender wage 
gaps or in female representation in top positions, although standard errors are large enough that 
we cannot rule economically meaningful gains. Finally, there is little evidence that the reform 
affected the decisions of women more generally; it was not accompanied by any change in female 
enrollment in business education  programs, or a convergence in earnings trajectories between 
recent male and female graduates of such programs. While young women preparing for a career 
in business report being aware of the reform and expect their earnings and promotion chances to 
benefit from it, the reform did not affect their fertility and marital plans. Overall, in the short run 
the reform had very little discernible impact on women in business beyond its direct effect on the 
newly appointed female board members. 
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Introduction 
Despite significant labor market progress over the last decades, women remain heavily 
underrepresented in high-earnings, high-status occupations. This is particularly true in the 
financial and corporate sectors of the economy. In a recent census of Fortune 500 companies in 
the U.S., Catalyst found that in 2013 women held only 16.9% of corporate board seats and 14.6% 
of Executive Officer positions in those companies, about the same as a half a decade earlier. 
In Europe, women represent only 11.9% of membership on boards of directors, despite being 
45% of the labor force, and these numbers are even smaller in the other parts of the world (Pande 
and Ford, 2011).  
This phenomenon—that at the top of the labor market women are under-represented and 
wages gaps are larger than average—is often referred to as the glass ceiling.  It is pervasive, 
observed even in countries that are otherwise thought of as having achieved the most progress in 
terms of gender equality.  Norway is one of these countries.  While the gender gap in wages in 
Norway was less than 14% on average among full time workers in 2002, it was 20% among 
college graduates.1 In 2000, only 5% of board members were women, and their annual earnings 
were 20 percent lower than those of male board members. 
To address this disparity, in December 2003 Norway passed a law requiring 40% 
representation of each gender on the board of directors of publicly limited companies. Because 
most firms did not comply, in January 2006 the law became compulsory and firms that did not 
comply by January 2008 would be dissolved. While a number of firms switched corporate status 
to avoid complying with the law, those that remained did comply and the median percentage of 
female board members among publicly limited companies reached 40% by 2007, from a median 
of 0% in 2003 (see Figure 1 and Appendix Table A1). 
Following Norway’s lead, Spain, Iceland, Italy, Finland, France, and the Netherlands have 
all passed similar reforms. The idea of mandating gender quotas on corporate boards has been 
gaining further political traction in Europe over the last years. In 2014 the new German coalition 
government passed legislation requiring that corporate boards be comprised of at least 30% 
women by 2016 (or else the seat would be left vacant).  On November 20 2013, the European 
parliament voted in favor of a proposed draft law that would require 40% female board members 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Background figures in the Norwegian Technical Calculation Committee for Wage Settlement committee's report 
submitted to the Ministry of Labor and Social Inclusion before the income settlement in 2012, Norwegian Ministry 
of Labor and Social Affairs (2012), tables 1.17 and 1.18 (NOU	  2012:	  11).	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in about 5,000 listed companies in the European Union by 2020; state-owned companies would 
be required to comply by 2018. Yet there is no evidence on whether these quotas work. Prior 
work has examined the secondary impact of the Norwegian reform on the stock market valuation, 
accounting performance and corporate policies of targeted companies (see among others 
Johansen and Sandnes 2008, Nygaard 2011, Ahern and Dittmar 2012, and Matsa and Miller 
2013).  In this paper we investigate whether the reform has been successful so far in its primary 
objective of reducing gender disparities in the corporate sector.  
In theory, quotas can be an effective tool to improve gender equality. This is particularly 
true if path dependence is a key factor for the under-representation of women in the highest 
corporate echelons.  Because qualified women might be harmed by an absence of networks to 
help them climb the corporate ranks, quotas can provide the initial step up that women need to 
break this cycle.  If discrimination is the key factor for the under-representation of women, quotas 
might help overcome any business prejudice (and improve efficiency) by forcing more exposure 
to talented women in positions of power (Beaman et al 2009, Rao 2013). However, if high-
quality women cannot be found, the quotas may backfire and reinforce negative stereotypes, 
resulting in a “patronizing equilibrium” with fewer women investing further in their careers as 
they see that it does not “take much” to become a board member (Coate and Loury 1993). 
We start by investigating effect of the Norwegian reform on the qualifications of board 
members. Opponents of the reform claimed there were not enough qualified women in Norway to 
fill the reserved board seats. Businesses were particularly vocal in expressing this concern in their 
lobbying against the reform (Criscione 2002).2 As a result, businesses may have decided to 
“game” the reform by strategically appointing sub-par women to their boards, expecting such 
women would be only minimal participants in board decisions.  If unqualified women are 
appointed then the possible benefits of the reform to others might be also muted, as they would 
not improve role models, have better business networks, or be vocal proponents of pro-female 
changes within the reforming companies.  
We show that these concerns were not relevant in practice. The average observable 
qualifications of the women appointed to the boards of publicly limited companies significantly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Storvik and Teigen (2010) and Heidenreich (2010). According to Heidenreich (2010), there is little evidence that 
the reform increased search costs for firms. She finds that that the recruitment process became more professionalized 
after the reform, and that women were recruited through the same professional networks and circles as male board 
members.  
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improved after the reform. While there is a substantial gap in observable qualifications between 
male and female board members both before and after the reform, this gap is substantially smaller 
after the reform. In addition, the gender gap in residual earnings within boards fell after the 
reform.  
We then explore how the reform impacted the labor market outcomes of women working 
in the companies that were mandated to increase female representation on their board. Does an 
increase female share in the boardroom translate in the recruitment or promotion of more women 
within these firms? If boards play a direct role in the selection of C-suite executives, female 
board members might be vocal proponents of female candidates for these positions, or might be 
able to leverage their own female-heavier business networks, to recommend female candidates 
for these positions. A higher share of women in the C-suite might then trickle down to a higher 
share of women in lower-down executive positions. Finally if boards can help shape human 
resource policies, female board members might be more likely to support changes in corporate 
policies that improve work-family balance, such as more part-time work or more amenities for 
women with children.  
Following Ahern and Dittmar (2012), we exploit variation across publicly limited 
companies in the pre-reform (2003) fraction of women on their board to identify the effect of the 
reform on firms. Companies that started with a larger share of women on their board had to make 
fewer changes to comply with the mandate, while companies that started with a smaller share had 
to make more changes. We find evidence suggestive of a growing representation of female 
employees at the very top of the earnings distribution (top 5 highest earners) within the 
companies that had to increase female representation on their board more to comply with the 
mandate. However, the representation of women does not improve anywhere else in the firms’ 
income distribution (top 95th percentile, top 90th percentile, top 75th percentile). We also see no 
improvements on gender wage gaps among top earners and find no evidence of changing work 
environments in affected firms. 
 We then look at the impact of the mandate on a broader set of highly qualified women 
in the Norwegian labor market, women whose qualifications mirror those of board members but 
were not (yet) appointed to a board. There are several theoretical reasons as to why the mandate 
may indirectly improve labor market outcomes for these women. First, if board membership is an 
attractive prize, these women have additional motivation to remain on the business “fast-track” 
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after the reform as the odds of winning this prize went up. Second, since the search for female 
board members helped in bringing these qualified women to the attention of businesses (e.g. 
many of these women may have been featured in the database), this may have reduced search 
frictions in the filling of other executive positions by women throughout the economy.  
We identify these effects by comparing the gender gap in labor outcomes of 3 cohorts of 
men and women with similarly high business qualifications, with 2 cohorts pre-dating the reform 
and one cohort post-dating the reform. We  find no evidence of significant differential 
improvements for women in the post-reform cohort, either in terms of average earnings or 
likelihood of filling in a top position in a Norwegian business. However, standard errors are large 
enough in some specifications that we cannnot rule out economically meaningful effects. 
Finally we consider broader possible effects of the reform on younger women interested 
in a business career and who are considering a business education, enrolled in a business 
education program, or recently graduated from such a program. While these young women are 
unlikely to be directly impacted by the reform (they are too young to be considered for a board 
position or a top executive position), it is possible that the reform inspired them to consider a 
business career, and that they see greater benefits in investing in such a career as a result. 
However we find no evidence of such an effect. There was no differential increase in female 
enrollment in business programs after the reform. A qualitative survey we performed in the Fall 
2013 at the Norwegian School of Economics suggest that female (and male) students are well 
aware of the reform and many of them expect to professionally benefit from it in terms of future 
earnings and likelihood of holding a top executive position. Yet very few female students report 
that the reform got them to reconsider their fertility plans (such as delaying fertility), which prior 
research suggests might be one of the biggest hurdle in keeping women with a business degree on 
the fast track (Bertrand, Goldin and Katz, 2011). Finally, comparing 3 cohorts of recent graduates 
from business programs (2 pre-reform and one post-reform), we see no apparent reduction in the 
large gender gap in earnings that emerge in the first few years post graduation. 
   
1. Context  
1.A. The Corporate Board Gender Quota Reform   
 Gender quotas legislating minimum representation of women on boards of directors 
were first introduced in Norway in 1981 and, at that time, only applied to government appointed 
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boards, councils, and committees.  This remained the status quo for almost twenty years.  In 
2001, the Norwegian government began official discussions to implement a more expansive 
board quota.  Teigen (2012) suggests that the privatization of state-owned firms in the 1980s and 
1990s had led to concerns about fairness because these newly privatized firms would no longer 
be covered under the existing legislation.  The first change in the law was proposed in 2002, and 
in December 2003, the Norwegian Company Act was revised. The previous quota for publicly 
appointed boards, council, and committees would now also apply to public limited liability 
companies (known as ASA firms in Norway).  This new law stated that all publicly limited 
liability companies were required to have at least 40% representation of each gender.3 By 2005 
however, the fraction of women on boards of directors of ASA firms was still only 17% (see 
Appendix Table A1), so sanctions were introduced.  Affected firms had until January 1, 2008 to 
comply or would be subject to forced dissolution.  By 2008, the average share of women on 
boards of ASA firms was 40% (Figure 1).  
When faced with the quota, firms could either choose to comply with the law or change 
their status from public to private. Appendix Table A1 shows that a large number of public 
limited liability companies changed their status to private after 2003. Of the 563 companies that 
were ASA in 2003, only 346 remained ASA by 2005 and only 179 by 2008. Focusing on 
companies listed on the stock exchange prior to the reform (a strict subset of all ASA firms), 
Ahern and Dittmar (2012) show that the likelihood of delisting anytime between 2003 and 2009 
was larger among those with a smaller pre-quota share of women on their board, suggesting that 
many firms might have delisted to avoid complying with the mandate. Thus the final number of 
new positions reserved for women was ultimately smaller than expected when the law was 
passed.  
 Given the large number of companies changing status, it is not surprising that business 
was overall quite opposed to the law, with their main argument being that there was a lack of 
qualified women to fill the reserved board positions. To address this concern, the government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The mandated gender representation depends on the total number of directors on the board.  If the board of 
directors has two or three members, both genders must be represented.  If the board has four or five members, there 
must be at least two members of each gender, and if the board has six to eight, each must have at least three.  If the 
board has nine members, there should be at least four member of each gender.  Beyond that, there must be at least 
40% of each gender. Median board size in ASA firms has been 5 throughout the 2000s (see Appendix Table A1).  In 
Norwegian firms above a certain size (200 employees), employees have the right to elect one third of the board 
members and the quota was to apply separately to employee-elected board members and shareholder-elected board 
members. 
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created a database of women interested in being appointed to boards “to make women’s 
competence more visible” (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Storvik and Teigen, 2010) 
 
1.B. Related Literature 
Existing evidence on the effects of the Norwegian board quota has focused on the 
relationship between board composition and firm performance.  To date, the evidence on the 
stock market response to the quote remains inconclusive. Johansen and Sandnes (2008) argue that 
stock prices of affected firms declined with the 2002 announcement, and Ahern and Dittmar 
(2012) document that firm value (as proxied by Tobin’s q) declined with the 2002 announcement. 
However, Nygaard (2011) finds that stock prices actually increased with the 2005 announcement. 
 Ahern and Dittmar (2012) also examine the effect of the quota on corporate policies and 
accounting performance.  Using data from firms’ annual reports, they show that the average age 
and experience of the new women directors was significantly lower than that of the existing male 
directors and argue that this change led to a (statistically insignificant) decline in accounting 
returns of the firm.  In addition, affected firms grew in size and made more acquisitions as a 
result of the change.  In a similar vein, using publicly available data, Matsa and Miller (2013) 
examine the effect of the quota on accounting performance.  Using firms in Sweden as a control 
group, they show that the change in the board quota law led to a decline in operating profits, 
primarily due to fewer layoffs.   
 While there is no prior literature that examines the effects of a board quota on the labor 
market opportunities of the affected groups, a number of recent papers have looked at the effects 
of other types of affirmative action policies.  Most closely related to our work is a wave of recent 
research looking at the introduction of political quotas in India.  Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) 
show that increased representation of women in village councils in India affected policy choices 
in a way that is consistent with increased representation of female preferences.  In terms of the 
effectiveness of the policy with regard to improving opportunities for women more generally, 
Beaman et al (2009) show that increased female representation in the village councils reduced the 
gender gap in aspirations for both parents and adolescents.  In addition, it erased the gender gap 
in education among adolescents.  Given that they find no evidence of changing opportunities for 
women, they argue that this is primarily due to more role models for young girls. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first paper examining the effects of a corporate board quota on women. 
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1.C. Gender Gap in Earnings in Norway 
 Norway is generally considered to be quite progressive in terms of gender equality. 
Norway is characterized by generous health insurance, family leave, and childcare provision. 
According to the World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report, Norway is ranked number 
three in terms of opportunities for women, where the ranking takes into account economic, 
health, political, and educational opportunities.  Despite this, a significant gender gap in earnings 
remains.4 
 While the earnings of women in Norway have been growing in the past few decades, 
the earnings of men appear to be growing even faster.  Figure 2A presents average annual 
earnings of women and men in the labor force starting in 1985. This disparity remains (and even 
grows) when we focus on individuals at the top of the income distribution; when we look at the 
90th percentile of earnings by gender (Figure 2B), one sees that the gender gap has widened 
substantially since 1985.  We see the same pattern when we limit the sample to individuals with 
MBAs (Figure 2C).  
Note that in neither of these pictures do we observe evidence of a break in trend for women 
after the board mandate. In our analysis below, we will consider whether any such break in trend 
becomes visible when we focus on subsets of women who are more likely to be affected by the 
reform, either because they ended up on corporate boards, because they are employed by a 
company that increased female representation on its board, or because they have qualifications 
that closely mirror those of board members. 
 
2. Data  
Our primary data source is the Norwegian Registry Data, a linked administrative dataset that 
covers the population of Norwegians between the ages of 16 and 64 for the years 1986-2010 and 
is a collection of different administrative registers such as the education register, family register, 
and the tax and earnings register.  These data are maintained by Statistics Norway and provide 
information about educational attainment (collected directly from the institution itself), labor 
market status, earnings, and a set of demographic variables (age, gender) as well as information 
about family members. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2013/	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For each individual in the labor force, we are able to identify the firm at which the 
individual is working.  Hence, we are able to observe the entire Norwegian workforce of a given 
firm.  We can also merge this data to different firm level data sets maintained by the Norwegian 
Business Register (“Bronnoysund Registrene”). One such dataset is The Register of Company 
Accounts, which contains extensive information on the balance sheets of Norwegian firms, 
including firm size and firm profits.  Furthermore, we obtain information from the Register of 
Business Enterprises on direct owner shares, the legal status of the business entity, whether the 
company is listed on the stock exchange, as well as aggregate board composition (size and 
gender). Finally, starting in 1998, we are also able to merge in administrative data on individual 
appointments to the board of directors to the Norwegian Registry data. We can thus identify the 
specific individuals in the Registry who are directors of an ASA firm in a given year.5  
 
3. How did the Quota Affect Gender Differences on Corporate Boards? 
Both the employers' federation (NHO) as well as many business leaders were against a 
mandatory quota.  While the employers’ federation main argument against the law was that it 
interfered with the shareholders right to appoint board members, businesses’ main argument 
against the law was that there were not enough qualified women to serve on the boards.6 
Therefore, we start our investigation of the effect of the reform by comparing women appointed 
to boards before and after the reform. 
Table 1 shows the average characteristics of women and men who served on the board of 
directors before (1998-2003) and after (2004-2010) the Norwegian board reform from detailed 
register data. Columns 1-4 report means for firms that were ASA in a given year. Because many 
ASA firms changed ownership status after 2003, we also show statistics for the group of firms 
that were ASA in 2003, whatever their ownership status is in other years (columns 5 to 8). 
Female board members are on average about 3 to 4 years younger than male board members 
and that age gap did not change much post-reform. Similarly, there were no large changes in the 
relative share of married board members. However, we do observe a growing representation of 
women with kids on the boards post-reform: while 75 percent of female board members had kids 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  As shown in Appendix Table A1, board data is missing for about 15% of ASA firms in 2002 but available for 
nearly all ASA firms by the end of the sample period (2010).	  
6	  These opinions were often quoted in newspaper articles around the time when the idea was first presented, for 
instance in the leading Norwegian business newspaper Dagens Næringsliv on February 22, 2002 (Egede-Nissen et al, 
2002), and in the Guardian on August 1, 2002, (Osborn, 2002).	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pre-reform (compared to 87 percent for men), that share went up to 83 percent post-reform 
(compared to 90 percent for men). 
These summary statistics show absolute improvements in educational and professional 
backgrounds for women and decreases in gender gaps post-reform. While the educational 
achievement of male board members did not change much after the reform, female board 
members in the post-reform period had completed about an extra half year of education. Most 
strikingly, while there were large gender gaps in the share of board members that had completed 
business or MBA degrees pre-reform, those gaps had essentially disappeared post-reform.  To the 
extent that such degrees are associated with more board specific skills, this suggests that women 
in the boardrooms post-reform have skills that are closer to those of the men with whom they 
work. 
The relative change in female board members’ schooling background is reflected in a relative 
improvement in their earnings prior to joining a board.  For each board member, we compute 
log(earnings) and earnings rank (either in their cohort, or in their cohort*education degree group) 
the year prior to joining a board. These earnings figures suggest convergence between male and 
female board members. For example, while only 43 percent of women on ASA boards pre-reform 
had earnings above the 90th percentile in their cohort and degree group, that share went up to 51 
percent post-reform; there was no change for men (61 percent pre-reform vs. 62 percent post-
reform). There is also an 8 percentage point increase in the share of women coming from top 
positions in their firm after the reform—the change for men is only 3 percentage points.  Also, 
interestingly, the fraction of women who have spouses on a board of directors fell post-reform, 
from 12% to only 7%.  While this could in part reflect the mechanical drop in the number of male 
board members, it also suggests the possibility that firms went beyond their traditional networks 
when trying to fill their quota.   
To examine these changes more thoroughly, Figure 3 displays the full distributions of female 
board member characteristics before and after the quota.  We include four variables: log 
(earnings) among workers (Panel A), potential experience (age minus years of education minus 
five, Panel B), percentile rank of earnings within one’s own cohort and education group (Panel C) 
and percentile rank of earnings within one’s own cohort (Panel D), all computed prior to an 
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appointment to an ASA board position.7  For these figures, we focus on ASA boards only (e.g. 
similar to columns 1 to 4 in Table 1). Consistent with the evidence when looking at the simple 
means (Table 1), it is clear that the distributions of women’s characteristics have shifted right for 
these important indicators of human capital (except potential experience).  Figure 4 displays the 
distributions of the same variables for both male and female board members, pre and post-reform. 
Again, consistent with the analysis of means, we see convergence between men and women in 
the post-reform period. 
We also calculated an overall index of board-related human capital.  The index is a 
weighted sum of the many observable characteristics discussed above.  To determine the weights, 
we use pre-reform data for men and calculate, using a linear probability model, which observable 
characteristics are most closely related to the probability of being on a board of directors in the 
next three years.8 We estimate this linear probability model among men only in the pre-reform 
period (pre-2001).  Then, using the estimated coefficients from the regression as weights, we 
predict the probability of being on a board for all men and women in a given year, before and 
then after the reform.  If board member human capital has increased, the predicted probability 
will increase too.  Panel C of Figure 4 presents the distributions of these predicted probabilities 
(or “board-specific human capital”) prior to an appointment to an ASA board position, for men 
and women before and after the reform.  Importantly, women appear to be “catching up” to men 
in terms of observable human capital.  
Next we investigate the trends in qualifications at the time of appointment in more 
detail—the before and after comparisons by year over time. Figure 5 displays the evolution of 
gender gap in characteristics at the time of appointment from 1999 onwards. We present mean 
gaps, and gaps adjusted for age, experience and board fixed effects. Gender gaps in earnings pre-
appointment (panel A) were falling pre reform, and they remained at their lowest level until 2010. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Education groups are defined according to the 2-digit level of the Norwegian classification standard (NUS2000), 
which is close to the International Standard Classification for Education (ISCED97). The 2-digit level of NUS2000 
has eight education levels and ten broad fields, which gives us 80 different education groups. We have reduced the 
number of education groups to 26 by combing all levels below lower secondary into one level instead of four, and 
not distinguishing between different broad fields for lower secondary education. For post-secundary education and 
above, we have defined eight broad fields instead of ten.	  
8	  The observable characteristics we include are education degree, age, age squared, earnings rank within cohort and 5 
lags of this variable, and finally degree type interacted with all of the following variables:  the probability that you 
are above the 90th percentile, the 95th percentile, and the 98th percentile in earnings within your cohort and five lags 
of each of these variables, an indicator of whether the individual is working and an indicator for out of the labor 
force and 5 lags of these variables.  	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We observe the same pattern for gender gap in likelihood the appointed member had earnings 
above the 90th percentile for their education and cohort (panel B). The gap in completed 
education (panel C) reverses and starts favoring women after 2004, and the gender gap in 
business degrees disappears and remains essentially zero post-reform. These patterns appear 
inconsistent with firm claims that they would be forced to appoint unqualified females to boards.  
We now document post-reform convergence in residual earnings between men and 
women while serving as board members by estimating the following equation: 
  
𝑌!" = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽𝑋!" + 𝜆! + 𝜖!" ,	   (1)	  
where the outcome of interest is log wages for individual i in year t, 𝜆! is a set of year dummies 
and Xit is a vector of individual controls (age and age squared, experience and experience 
squared). We estimate equation (1) separately for the pre-reform years (1998-2003) and the post-
reform years (2004-2010) using the population of individuals serving as board members in an 
ASA firm in a given year. To account for changes in the number and composition of ASA firms 
over time, we also estimate a version of equation (1) that includes board fixed effects, hence 
allowing us to focus on gender gaps in residual earnings among individuals that are serving on 
the same board.  
 The results are reported in Table 2. In our preferred specification that includes board 
fixed effects, we see that in the pre-reform period (column 3) women earned about 38% less than 
their male counterparts.  This gap fell to between 28 and 32% after the reform (column 4), 
depending on whether we look at ASA firms or at firms that were ASA in 2003. Hence, post-
reform, ASA boards became more equal not just based on the number of men and women sitting 
at the table, but also in the “caliber” of these individuals. Figure 6 explores the evolution of 
gender gaps in outcomes by year, rather than pooling pre and post years together. These results 
are similar: gender gaps in earnings were falling pre reform, and by 2010 their level is similar to 
the 2004 level (panel a). The reform does appear to be associated with a (somewhat mechanical) 
decrease in the gender gap in representation in top positions after 2006. 
 While the results in Table 2 are consistent with the improved selection of female board 
members documented in Table 1, they may also reflect differences over-time between the 
genders in the earnings premium associated with becoming a board member. To investigate this 
we estimate the “premium” associated with becoming a board member and how this premium has 
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changed over time for males and females. Specifically, we select the sample of individuals who 
were ever board members over the sample period (1998 to 2010) and estimate the following 
equation: 
 
𝑌!" = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝐵!" + 𝛽𝑋!" + 𝛾! + 𝜆! + 𝜖!"     (2) 
 
where Yit is the outcome for individual i at time t, Bit is an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
individual i was a board member of an ASA firm in year t, Xit is a vector of time-varying 
individual controls (age and age squared and experience and experience squared), 𝛾! is an 
individual fixed effect, and 𝜆! are year dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the individual 
level. Because our regression includes individual fixed effects, 𝛼! captures the effect of changes 
in board membership status on earnings, or the “board premium”. 
Table 3 presents the results when we estimate this equation for a variety of outcomes, 
separately for men and women, prior to the implementation of the gender quota reform (1998-
2003) and after the reform (2004-2010).  The table reports the board premium from individual 
regressions for each group, time period and outcome. We estimate the board premium both for all 
boards and for ASA firms only. 
Not surprisingly, there are substantial financial returns to being elected to a board of 
directors.  Becoming a board member is associated with an increase in annual earnings of 4% for 
women and about 1% for men prior to the reform. This premium is substantially higher for both 
men and women in ASA boards, between 9 and 5%. This board premium fell after 2004 for all 
firms, from 4 to 3% for women from 1 to 0.6% for men. Interestingly however, the ASA-board 
premium fell slightly for women after the reform (from 9.4 to 8%) while it increased for men 
(from 4.6 to 10%).  This suggests that if anything, the convergence in earnings within boards we 
observe in Table 2 might have been even larger if only driven by the improved selection of 
female board members. 
Table 3 also shows that becoming board member of an ASA firm is also associated with an 
increased likelihood of entering the C-suite of an organization (which we proxy with as being one 
of the 5 top earners within an organization in a given year). We do not see much difference in this 
specific premium between men and women, either before or after the reform.  
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4. How did the Quota Affect Gender Gaps within Publicly Limited Liability Firms? 
Given the earlier evidence that publicly-limited firms were able to find high-human capital 
women to assume the reserved board positions, we now turn to the question of whether the 
presence of these new female board members led to better opportunities for women working 
within these firms.  Indeed, by forcing a higher representation of women in the corporate 
boardrooms of publicly limited companies, the Norwegian Reform may have spurred other 
changes within firms that benefitted female employees. For example, as a result of the reform, 
publicly-limited companies may have hired more women to top management positions.  This 
could have been the result of a new awareness of the existence of highly qualified women 
acquired during the search for female board members. Or perhaps women appointed to corporate 
boards play a direct role in improving outcomes for other women within the organization: they 
may recommend more female candidates for top executive positions, and may be more favorably 
inclined towards these candidates. In addition, female board members may be more vocal in 
urging companies to adopt human resource policies that favor other women; such policies may 
include tighter controls on pay, or more flexible work options for women, especially those with 
children.  Such policies, if implemented, may increase the attractiveness of these companies for 
women and ultimately result in a greater female employment share. 
On the other hand, some might argue that changes in the female representation in the board 
room will not translate in further gains for women within the organizations. One reason could be 
that corporate boards just do not matter much. In particular, boards may have little say in 
recruiting decisions or human resource policies. It is also possible that while boards matter, a 
40% quota does not give women a majority opinion in board decisions, limiting their influence 
on personnel decisions. This could translate into no change for women within affected firms, or 
even a backlash by the remaining men on the boards. Finally, while females are presumed to 
recommend and favor candidates of their own gender for an appointment or a promotion, this 
might be not the case in practice. In an interesting paper, Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010) study 
the decisions of recruiting committees for 4 main Corps of the Spanish Judiciary. Because the 
allocation of (male and female) candidates to committees is random, they can study how the 
gender composition of the committee affects hiring. They find that female candidates are 
significantly less likely to be hired when the share of female recruiters is relatively higher 
suggesting that female majority committees tend to overestimate the quality of male candidates.  
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We bring all of these considerations to the data by examining whether there is any evidence 
of improvement in women’s outcomes in the publicly limited companies that were mandated to 
increase female representation on their board.  The particular outcomes we focus on include the 
female employment share as well as the employment of women with MBAs. We also study 
women’s representation at the top of these organizations: we consider women’s representation in 
the highest paid and five highest paid jobs within these organizations, as well lower down in the 
income distribution within these organizations (top income vigintile, decile, and quartile). To 
account for possible changes in human resource policies that may have improved family-work 
balance, we consider the representation of women with kids, the likelihood of women working 
part-time, and the earnings of women with kids. 
Our econometric identification strategy is similar to that in Stevenson (2010) and Ahern and 
Dittmar (2012). We use the pre-reform (which we define as 2003) variation in female board 
representation across publicly limited companies to capture exogenous variation in mandated 
changes in the proportion of female board members. The logic of this identification strategy is 
simple. The publicly limited companies that started with a higher share of women on their board 
prior to the reform had to make smaller changes to their boards to comply with the law, while 
those that started with a smaller share had to make larger changes. In particular, focusing on the 
2003-2010 time period, we estimate the following baseline regression: 
𝑌!"# = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑!" + 𝛾! + 𝜆! + 𝜖!" .       (3) 
 
where Yijt is a characteristic or outcome for individual i working in firm j at time t (such as 
whether the individual is a woman, or a woman with an MBA; or whether the individual is the 
top earner within the organization), FemaleBoardit is the percentage of female board members in 
firm i at time t, 𝛾! are firm fixed effects, and 𝜆! are year fixed effects.  We instrument for 
FemaleBoardit with FemaleBoardi2003 interacted with year fixed effects.  
The population of interest for the regression above is the set of workers in the Individual 
Register who are employed by publicly limited companies.9 While isolating this population a 
priori seems like an easy task given the availability of firm identification numbers in the 
Individual Register, the task is complicated by the intricacies of corporate ownership structures in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Note that because the Individual Register data only covers individuals physically working in Norway, our analysis 
below does not cover employees of Norwegian publicly limited companies based outside of Norway. 
	   17	  
Norway. As documented in La Porta et al (1999), ownership pyramids are common in many 
developed economies outside the US, with a company at top of a pyramid (often a holding 
company) having control on other companies lower down in the pyramid. We therefore need to 
map each publicly limited company to the set of firms (and employees) in the Individual Register 
that are ultimately controlled by this publicly limited company.10  
Once we have identified the set of individuals who are ultimately employed by a publicly-
limited parent in a given year, we further restrict our attention to the subset of parents that were 
already publicly-limited in 2003, e.g. right before the reform was implemented. This is our main 
sample for the analysis below, covering the set of workers whose ultimate employer was treated 
by the reform.  
As we mentioned earlier, a substantial number of companies that were publicly-limited in 
2003 changed legal status after the Reform was passed. Using the Register of Company 
Accounts, we identify the set of firms that are ultimately owned by a publicly-limited liability 
company in 2003 and that the reform intended to treat. This alternative sample includes all 
individuals working at those firms between 2003 and 2010, whether or not their ultimate owner 
remained publicly-limited after 2003. 
Appendix Table A2 provides a summary of the main features of both the main and alternative 
samples. Column 1 lists the number of parents we identify in each year, while column 2 lists that 
same number conditional on non-missing board data for the parent. As expected, the intent-to-
treat sample (Panel B) contains a larger number of parents throughout the sample period. By 
2010, only 92 parent companies remain in the treated sample, compared to 237 in the intent-to-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In order to map each publicly limited company to the set of firms (and employees) in the Individual Register that 
are ultimately controlled by this publicly limited company, we proceed as follows. When firms submit their annual 
accounts to the Register of Company Accounts, they are required to disclose information about the largest corporate 
owner if this corporate owner holds more than, or equal to, 50% of the shares in the company. So for each worker in 
the Individual Register, we know whether his or her employer has a corporate parent that owns at least 50% of the 
shares. By tracing these ownership structures in the Register of Company Accounts, we can therefore identify the 
ultimate corporate owner of each firm in the Individual Register. Because a publicly limited company can itself 
ultimately be controlled by another publicly limited company, the sample of publicly limited firms whose board 
composition we exploit in this analysis is smaller than the full sample of publicly limited companies. Also, in some 
instances, the ultimate owner of a Norwegian firm is a foreign entity. In those instances, we assign control of that 
firm to the Norwegian company that is the highest up in the ownership chain; we include that firm, and its 
employees, in our sample if that ultimate Norwegian parent is publicly limited.  
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treat sample. Because several of the parent companies in Panel B ended up changing legal status, 
the average and mean percentage of women on the board (columns 3 and 4 respectively) in that 
sample, while also growing after 2003, never reaches the mandated 40%.11  
 Appendix Table A3 reports first-stage regressions. In each column, the dependent 
variable is the percentage of women on a board of directors in the parent company in a given 
year. The instruments are the percentage of women on the board in the parent company in 2003 
interacted with year dummies. Also included in each regression are year dummies and firm fixed 
effects. Even numbered columns also include 20 industry category fixed effects interacted with a 
linear time trend. Standard errors are clustered at the parent company level. The first-stage results 
are qualitatively comparable across all columns, and the signs and magnitudes on the 
instrumental variables are as expected. Parent companies that started with a larger share of 
women on their boards increased the share of women on their board less throughout the quota 
treatment period. The point estimates indicated that the biggest adjustment to percentage female 
happened starting in 2007, e.g. right after the mandate became compulsory and the threat of 
dissolution was introduced. Not surprisingly, the point estimates on the instruments are always 
smaller in the intent-to-treat sample than in the treated sample. 
Appendix Table A4 provides summary statistics for the employees of ASA firms between 
2003 and 2010. On average ASA firms cover 2.2% of total employment during this period. 
Slightly less than 30 percent of them are women. Male and female employees are on average 42 
to 43 years old, about 70% of them have children, and about 4% have completed an MBA degree. 
A much higher fraction of female than male employees are working part-time (14% vs. 4%). As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Column 5 reports the number of separate business entities (parents and affiliates) in each year. In 2003, there are 
3386 different companies in both samples. That number drops dramatically over time in both samples, reaching 
about 1200 by 2010. The reasons for the drop in sample sizes are however different across samples. In the treated 
sample, any company whose parent in that year switches legal status gets dropped with its parent; however, any 
company that is acquired in a given year by an ASA parent gets added to the sample. In the intent-to-treat sample, 
the reason for the drop in sample size is that only a subset of the fixed set of parents and affiliates that were identified 
in 2003 can be found in subsequent years. Finally, column 6 of Appendix Table A2 reports the average corporate 
layer of each firm in the sample each year.  We assign 0 to the parent company, 1 to the affiliate immediately below 
that parent (e.g. the parent company owns 50% or more of an affiliate in layer 1), 2 to the affiliate immediately 
below that (e.g. the affiliate in layer 1 owns 50% of more of an affiliate in layer 2), etc. The average corporate layer 
is between 1.5 and 1.9 throughout the sample period across both datasets. This suggests that Norwegian business 
groups are on average not particularly deep compared to what has been documented in other parts of the world 
(LaPorta et al, 1999). 
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expected, male and female employees are unequally represented in the organization’s income 
distribution. For example, while 30% of male employees earn more than the 75% of those in their 
cohort and education group, that share is only 11% among female employees. While 1% of male 
employees are top 5 earners within their organization, that share is only .2% among female 
employees.  
The main IV results showing the impact of the reform on ASA firms are in Tables 4, 5 and 6. 
We perform this analysis at the individual employee level, thereby putting more weight on 
parents with a larger number of affiliates and larger overall employment. In odd numbered 
columns, we control for firm and year fixed effects; in even columns, we include 20 industry 
categories interacted with a linear time trend. In all regressions, we cluster standard errors at the 
parent company level. Table 4 shows little evidence of any positive impact of a mandated 
increased in the percentage of female board members on female employment (columns 1 and 2), 
the employment of women with business degrees (columns 3 and 4), the employment of women 
with children (columns 5 and 6), or the employment of women working part-time (columns 7 and 
8). This holds both in the treated sample (Panel A) and the intent-to-treat sample (Panel B). 
Theoretically, we would expect corporate boards to exert the largest possible influence on the 
appointment of C-suite employees. While our data does not allow us to directly identify who is in 
the C-suite, we proxy for it by isolating individuals that are either the top earner (likely the CEO) 
or one of the top 5 earners within the organization in a given year. Results are reported in Table 
5. We do not observe a statistically significant relationship between the percentage of women on 
the board and the likelihood that a female employee is the top earner in the ASA group. The 
evidence in columns 4 to 6 and 10 to 12 suggest that a higher share of female directors may 
increase the chance that a female employee (columns 4 to 6) or a female employee with children 
(columns 10 to 12) is one of the top five earners within the ASA group. The magnitudes of these 
effects are not trivial. Given that on average .002 percent of female employees are in the C-suite 
(e.g. one of the top 5 earners), the estimated coefficients in Table 5 suggests that increasing the 
share of female board members from 5 to 40% would more than double female representation in 
the C-suites of these companies. Clearly though, the number of women that would be directly 
positively affected by such changes at the very top of the executive ladder is limited. 
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Greater numbers could be affected if any changes at the very top trickled-down the 
organization. We investigate this possibility in Table 6. We define for each female employee the 
likelihood of having earnings that fall in the top quartile (columns 1 to 3), top decile (columns 4 
to 6) or top vigintile (columns 7 to 9) of the entire (men and women) earnings’ distribution within 
the group (parent plus affiliates). We fail to find evidence of any gains for female employees in 
these less rarefied executive layers. In fact, most of the point estimates are negative, but all are 
statistically insignificant when we include individual controls. 
To summarize, we conclude that the mandate to increase female representation in the 
boardroom may have increased female employees’ representation in the C-suite of the targeted 
companies.  However, we observe very few other positive changes outside the very top. The 
changes we observe at the very top, although they affected only a very small number of women 
directly, are nonetheless important: they are inconsistent with the views that a) corporate boards 
may not influence human resource decisions, b) a 40% share does not give female directors the 
ability to influence such decisions and c) female directors may be tougher (softer) than male 
directors in their evaluation of female (male) candidates for C-suite jobs. The lack of positive 
spillovers beyond the very top must be put into perspective: only a short amount of time has 
passed since the reform, and it may be too early to tell whether or not a larger number of female 
employees will benefit from the gender quota in the board room. 
5. How did the Quota Affect Gender Gaps at the Top of Labor Market? 
The ultimate goal of the reform was to improve labor market opportunities for all 
professional women, not just for those sitting on boards. In the previous section, we examined 
outcomes for one group that could indirectly benefit from the gender board quota: women 
employed in firms that were required to comply with the quota. In this section, we consider 
another set of women who might have indirectly benefitted from the reform: highly qualified 
women working in business settings and whose credentials mirror those of board members, even 
if they themselves have not (yet) been appointed to board. The mandate may have indirectly 
resulted in improved labor market outcomes for these women in many ways. First, to the extent 
that board membership is an attractive prize (see Table 3), the reform generates additional 
motivation to remain on the business fast track as the odds of winning this prize increased. 
Second, since the search for female board members helped bring these qualified women to the 
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attention of businesses (e.g. many of these women may have been featured in the database), this 
may have reduced search frictions in the filling of other executive positions by women 
throughout the economy, and thus broken the cycle of dependence on old business networks. 
Third, the newly appointed female board members, if not recommending these women 
exclusively for a position at their firm, may have been in a superior position to spread 
information about these women throughout the Norwegian corporate sector more broadly.  
To determine the effect of the quota on gender gaps more generally, we follow a cohort 
approach and ask whether the gender gap in the last (post-reform) cohort is smaller than for 
previous cohorts.  
There is no unique way to define the set of highly qualified women in the business sector 
who might have benefitted from the quota reform even without having been appointed to the 
boards of ASA firms. We consider two different definitions. First we use the predicted 
probability of board membership constructed in Section 3 to define the group of women who are 
most similar to women on boards, and thus most likely affected. This measure is estimated by 
predicting board membership based on observables for men in 1998-2003. Using the coefficients 
from this regression, we generate the predicted probability of board membership for all 
individuals and periods based on observables. We define the targeted group as those individuals 
with the highest predicted probability of becoming board members in the period immediately 
before the reform. Based on the distribution of this predicted probability, we define the affected 
groups as individuals with a probability of becoming a board member above the 99.5th percentile 
of the propensity score in 1989 (for the 1990-1996 cohort), 1996 (for the 1997-2003 cohort) and 
2003 (for the 2004-2010 cohort).12 Given the ultimately arbitrary nature of this sample definition, 
we also report results using a narrower and easily observed definition: we select individuals with 
a business degree, graduate or undergraduate, whose earnings were above the 98th percentile of 
the earnings distribution (of individuals with the same education and experience) in each of the 
three years preceding. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Appendix Figure 2 shows the predicted probability of becoming a board member in the post-period as a function 
of this propensity score.  Each point represents the difference in the probability of board membership between those 
with predicted probabilities above and below the cutoff after the reform.  The plot begins at 95.1 percentile and, for 
this first point, the control group is the 95.0 percentile.  To select the cutoff we note that if the “true” cutoff were at 
the 96th percentile for instance, then the graph would show a peak exactly at the 96th percentile (see Appendix Figure 
3).  The figure shows that at the lower levels (95.1-99.0), there is little difference between the probability of board 
membership after the reform for those above and below the cutoff, although it is slowly rising with the percentile (as 
one might expect).  However, there is a clear increase in the difference after the 99th percentile, although there is no 
peak. This suggests that the affected group is smaller than the 99th percentile.	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We divide our sample into three 7-year time periods (1990-1996, 1997-2003 and 2004-
2010) and, in each period, consider the earnings of men and women who are between the ages of 
35 and 55, because most board members fall within this age group (See Appendix Figure 1). 
Because of aging, individuals can appear in more than one seven-year period. Specifically, we 
estimate the following equation: 
 
𝑌!" = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! + 𝛼!𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒! ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒! + 𝛼!𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒! + 𝛽𝑋!" + 𝜆! + 𝜖!" . (4) 
 
where Yit is the outcome of interest (log of earnings or an indicator for earning above the 95th 
percentile income within a firm), Postt is an indicator equal to one if this is the post-reform cohort 
(2004-2010), Pret is an indicator for the earliest cohort (1990-1996).  The omitted cohort is the 
cohort just prior to the reform (1997-2003). Xit refers to time varying individual characteristics 
(age and age squared, potential experience dummies), and fixed individual characteristics (an 
indicator for whether the individual was working at the time of selection into his or her cohort, as 
well as marital status and presence of children at the time the individual was selected into his or 
her cohort).  We control for year dummies (𝜆!) and cluster the standard errors at the person level.   
The coefficient 𝛼! measures the gender gap in the 7 years prior to the reform, and we 
expect it to be negative; that is, women earned less than men. The gender gap after the reform is 
given by 𝛼! + 𝛼!, thus 𝛼! measures the change the gender gap in the post-reform period. A 
positive coefficient indicates that the gender gap fell after the reform. The gender gap two periods 
(14 years) before the reform is given by 𝛼! + 𝛼!. If gender gaps fell throughout the period at the 
same rate then 𝛼! = −𝛼!. Thus 𝛼!’s sign and magnitude indicate whether the change we observe 
after the reform constitutes a significant deviation from the trends prior to the reform. Because 
we employ a cohort approach, the key identifying assumption is that the composition of the 
cohort is not changing overtime in unobserved ways. To assess the validity of this assumption we 
also estimate regressions that control for the value of Y in the year the individual was selected 
into his or her cohort. 
 Table 7 presents results. The gender gaps in earnings in the period preceding the reform 
are substantial, with women in these top groups earning between 14 and 16% less than the men 
(Panel A). These gaps appear to have shrunk after the reform: all the coefficients on 
female*(2004-2010) are positive and non-trivial in magnitude, but they are all statistically 
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insignificant. However, if we drop from the sample individuals who serve on boards (those 
directly affected) then all coefficients become negative and remain statistically insignificant. If 
we concentrate on the last three years of each cohort to allow for a lag in the appearance of an 
effect (e.g. only 2008-2010 for the last cohort, 2001-2003 for the middle cohort and 1994-1996 
for the earliest cohort) the coefficients remain small or negative and always insignificant. Thus, 
although women newly appointed to boards do benefit from the mandate, there is no evidence of 
benefits among those women not directly affected. Nor is there any evidence that an effect is 
“emerging”.  
 While our analysis is restricted to very small and highly selected groups of top male and 
female earners, it is still possible that men and women within those selected groups are not 
directly comparable to each other. More importantly, the baseline gender differences between 
males and females might differ across the 3 synthetic cohorts. Thus in Panel B, we re-estimate 
equation (5) controlling for each individual’s log annual earnings in the year prior to the 
beginning of his or her cohort (e.g. 1989 for the 1990-1996 cohort; 1996 for the 1997-2003 
cohort; and 2003 for the 2004-2010 cohort). These results are presented in Panel B. The average 
gender gap in earnings that emerge between men and women in the pre-reform cohort is smaller 
under this alternative specification (reaching at most 5 percent, column 4). There is also little 
evidence of any substantial change between the earliest cohort (1990-1996) and the middle cohort 
(1997-2003) under this alternative specification. Most strikingly, this additional control tends to 
reduce the point estimate on 𝛼! (which would occur if the males and females in the post-reform 
synthetic cohort were more comparable to each other than those in the two pre-reform synthetic 
cohorts).  Overall in Panel B, the results suggest little evidence of any improvement in earnings 
for women in the post-reform cohort, especially when we restrict the analysis to individuals who 
did not mechanically benefit from the quota. However the standard errors are large. 
 Despite no clear sign of reduced gender gaps in earnings, it is possible that the reform 
improved the representation of women in top positions within firms, for which there is some 
evidence in Table 5. In Table 8 we estimate gender gaps in the probability of being one of the top 
5 earners within a firm. As in Table 7, the evidence in Table 8 suggests no systematic 
improvement in female representation in the C-suites of corporations, if anything the estimates 
are negative. Interestingly, in both tables 7 and 8 it appears that women are actually doing worse 
in the period prior to the reform than the earliest period, suggesting that our finding of no effect 
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may in fact represent a break from a negative trend, although our standard errors are too large to 
distinguish this.  Overall, we find little evidence suggesting that the Norwegian board reform had 
any statistically significant impact on high-achieving women beyond the effect on board 
members themselves. 	  
 
6. How did the Quota Affect Gender Gaps among Young People? 
In a final step, we examine the effect of the reform for young individuals who are 
contemplating a career a business, are currently pursuing an education degree toward such a 
career, or have recently started such a career. While a clean estimation strategy of the impact of 
the reform for this broader set of individuals is not available, we combine time series evidence, 
qualitative surveys and cohort analyses to document associations between the reform and young 
women’s (and men’s) choices, expectations, and early career outcomes. 
We start by assessing whether the reform coincided with changes in the share of young 
men and women interested in pursuing a business degree: if the reform made business careers 
more appealing for women, then we might observe an increase in the fraction of women 
obtaining the degrees that lead to those careers. In 2000, 11% of women and 17% of men 
completed their undergraduate studies with a business degree, while 14.5% of women and 22% 
of men completing graduate programs did so with a degree in business. To investigate how the 
reform affected the decisions of students to obtain business degrees, we estimate the following 
linear regression: 
 
𝑌!" = 𝛼! + 𝛼!!𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 ∗ (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 = 𝑡)+ 𝛽𝑋!" + 𝜆! + 𝜖!", (5) 
  
where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if individual i graduated with a business 
degree in year t (or alternatively from business law or social studies) and the independent variable 
of interest is a dummy for female interacted with a year dummy. The regression also controls for 
age and age squared and year dummies. We estimate this regression for those obtaining a 
graduate degree and then for those obtaining an undergraduate degree.  
We display the results of the estimation graphically in Figure 7, both for graduates (Panel 
A) and undergraduates (Panel B). Each point in the figure represents the estimated coefficient for 
female in that year, thus showing whether women were more or less likely than men to graduate 
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with a business oriented major in that year. The gender gap is normalized to 0 in the baseline year 
(2000). Regardless of our definition of “business-oriented” majors, we find no increase in the 
share of female majors in 2004 or in 2006.13 If anything, the share of women obtaining business 
degrees fell after 2004 (except for 2007).14  Thus, we see little evidence suggesting that the 
reform coincided with an increase in young women’s interest in business degrees. 
Next we look at evidence of any actual changes in the gender gap in early career earnings 
among recent graduates of business programs. We follow an empirical approach similar to that in 
Section 5 (Tables 7 and 8). We construct 3 cohorts of recent (within 3 years of completing their 
degree) male and female graduates from either a business program or a business, law, or social 
studies program, and study the gender gaps that emerge over a 7 year period. We include two pre-
reform cohorts (1990-1996 and 1997-2003) and post-reform cohort (2004-2010).  
 Table 9 presents the results of estimating equation (5) for this sample of recent 
graduates. The gender gap in earnings among recent graduates in the middle cohort (1997 to 
2003) is very large, between 22 and 27%. This gap does not change in the post reform period: the 
coefficient on female*(2004-2010) is small and statistically insignificant for both groups of 
graduates. And again we do not find statistically significant or large effects of the reform on 
gender gaps when we allow for a delayed effect and concentrate on the last 3 years of each 
cohort.  
Finally to understand how young people’s perceptions might have been affected by the 
Reform, we also conducted an online survey of all current students (both male and female) at the 
Norwegian School of Economics, one of Norway’s most prestigious business schools. Students 
received an invitation to answer the short survey; a total of 763 students responded, with a bit 
more than half women (54%).15 
Table 10 shows the distribution of responses by gender. The vast majority of students 
reported being aware of the reform (70% of women and 75% of men). About 50% of women 
expect their earnings to increase as a result of the reform, while 40% expect them to be 
unaffected (with a remaining 10% expecting a decline). Interestingly almost 30% of men expect 
the reform to lower their earnings while only 10% expect their earnings to increase (with a 
remaining 60% expecting no change). Similarly, most women (70%) believe the reform will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Overall the estimated coefficients are not statistically significant. 
14 In Norway, as in the United States, undergraduates primarily choose their major once enrolled in college. 
15 Those completing the survey would be eligible to win one of 20 500 NOK gift cards. 
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make it more likely they will eventually be in top executive business positions, while 50% of men 
expect their chances to be in such positions to have decreased as a result of the reform. Fewer 
than 10% of women report that the quota increased their motivation to obtain a business degree, 
and only 4% of men reported a decrease—consistent with our regression analysis showing no 
significant changes in the fraction of women choosing business-oriented degrees. 
Despite the large share of female respondents who report expecting that the reform will 
improve their labor market outcomes, we find little evidence that these young women anticipate 
modifying their family plans as a result. When asked about their marital and fertility plans 
(whether and when to have children), almost all women reported that the reform left those plans 
unaffected.  This is particularly notable given that prior research suggests that child birth might 
be one of the biggest hurdles to keeping women with a business degree on the fast track in their 
early years out of school  at least in the U.S. (Bertrand, Goldin and Katz 2011). The fact that the 
reform did not change these young women‘s fertility plans may limit the potential for actual 
earnings gains. 
In regressions not reported here, we also re-estimated equation 5 in the samples of recent 
graduates using number of children and marital status as alternative dependent variables. Here 
again, we found no evidence of any changes in the outcomes in the post-reform cohort. This is 
consistent with the findings that emerged from the self-reported marital and fertility plans in our 
qualitative survey of current business students. There is no sign that the reform was associated 
with changes either expected or actual changes in family decisions among the set of younger 
women that will be eligible to become board members in the near future. 
   
7. Conclusion 
This paper provides what we believe is the first effort to assess whether gender quotas in 
business can be an effective tool to reduce gender disparities in the corporate sector. The 
Norwegian approach, focused on mandating gender diversity on corporate boards, is important to 
study since it is being adopted by more and more countries throughout Europe. Our study of the 
“mechanical” effect of the quota offers optimistic news for supporters of this affirmative action 
policy. Despite businesses’ fear that there were not enough qualified women to fill the board 
positions, the new reserved seats were filled with women who are observationally better qualified 
to serve on boards than women appointed before, suggesting that previously untapped networks 
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of top business women were activated by the policy. As a consequence, the gender gap in 
earnings within boards fell at the same time as the boards became more diverse. As argued 
earlier, we view such a finding nearly as a necessary condition for the hope of any positive 
spillovers of the quota policy beyond its mechanical effect.  
When looking for evidence of any such spillovers in the subset of the economy where we 
would expect them the most, the evidence is more mixed. We find no effect on the set of highly 
qualified women across Norway. We do find increased likelihood of finding female employees in 
the C-suite of firms that were targeted by the mandate. Any signs of female gains however seem 
to be limited to this very rarified set of employees. However, we do observe the gains where we 
would indeed expect the most direct influence being exerted by the boards, and hence where we 
would expect the first positive changes to occur.  
We also considered the possibility that the law was important in changing expectations, 
behaviors, and outcomes among the younger cohorts entering the corporate sector. Most 
interesting was qualitative evidence based on self-reported data. Career expectations of young 
women in business went up, with many viewing the reform as improving their future earnings or 
increasing the likelihood of making it to the very top corporate echelons.  It is possible that the 
positive mindset the reforms induced among young women in business will ultimately encourage 
them to stay on the fast track for longer. At the same time, we did not see much actual change in 
the gender gap in labor market outcomes among this younger group around the time the reform 
came into effect, nor do we see any actual or reported change in marital status and fertility. At 
least in the short run, these improved expectations have not resulted in any significantly different 
choices or outcomes among the young. 
While it is likely too early to draw definitive conclusions, the evidence we report in this paper 
suggests that governments should be wary of placing too much faith in this specific affirmative 
action policy as a broad solution to the persistent under-representation of women in the top layers 
of the business sector.  Yet, supporters of this policy will also see some positive takeaways in our 
results. First, businesses’ main argument against the policy (lack of qualified women) appears 
weak in light of the fact that the newly appointed female board members were—on paper at 
least—more qualified than those appointed before; most likely, the reform spurred a more 
widespread search effort and helped break some of the “old boys” networks that may have 
dominated the board appointment process prior to the reform. Second, the changes in the C-suite 
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of the targeted firms we observe are the most immediate changes that could have been achieved, 
as board members can play a more direct role in such appointments. While we do not observe any 
trickling-down to other top managerial positions, it is possible not enough time has passed for 
such spillovers to occur. Third, it is telling that young women preparing themselves for a career 
in business widely support the policy and perceive it as opening more doors and opportunities for 
their future career. Hence, it is possible then that the reform might have broader longer-term 
effects we cannot yet observe. An evaluation in the spirit of this one should be repeated in a 
decade or so. However, because similar policies are currently discussed in many countries, we 
view this short-term evidence as relevant information into the law-making and policy-making 
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Figure 3: Economic Background of Female Board Members, Pre and Post-Reform 
Panel A: Log of Annual Earnings before 
appointment 
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Figure 4: Economic Background of Male and Female Board Members 
Before the Reform After the Reform 
Panel A: Log of Annual Earnings before appointment 
  
 
Panel B: Percentile of earnings within education-cohort before appointment 
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Dotted line reports mean differences between men and women. Solid line reports adjusted differences, from a 
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Figure 6: Evolution of gender gap in outcomes among ASA board members 
 
 
Dotted line reports mean differences between men and women from a regression that controls for experience, 
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Figure 7: Gender Gap in Graduation from Business Programs, By Graduation Year 
Panel A: Graduate Degree 
 
Panel B: Undergraduate Degree 
 
Dashed line reports the results for business degree and the solid line includes social studies and law in addition to 
business degrees. The graphs report coefficient of female*D(Year=y) in a regression predicting whether individual 
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Appendix Figure 2: Change in Women’s Probability of Becoming a Board Member 
2004-2010 Cohort vs. 1998-2003 Cohort 
(as a Function of Baseline Percentile of the Board Human Capital Index) 
 
Figure reports the coefficient of post*treat in regression where ASA=1 is the outcome, post=1 if the year is 2004 or 
later, and treat=1 for individual i if i’s predicted propensity of becoming a board member is above the nth percentile 
of the propensity score distribution. The propensity to become a board member is predicted by first estimating the 
probability of becoming a board member among males in the pre-period based on their covariates. We then use the 
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Highest grade completed 14.45 14.5 14.13 14.87 14.49 14.46 14.2 14.63
Business degree 0.32 0.35 0.21 0.37 0.32 0.37 0.2 0.39
MBA degree 0.18 0.2 0.08 0.19 0.17 0.2 0.08 0.18
Age 47.75 49.54 44.2 45.63 47.86 49.37 44.3 45.84
Log of earnings 13.43 13.68 13.18 13.5 13.47 13.67 13.22 13.5
Earnings rank in cohort and degree 83.03 82.92 77.21 78.94 83.51 83.34 79.06 80.01
Earnings rank in cohort/degree>90th 
percentile
0.61 0.62 0.43 0.51 0.62 0.62 0.46 0.52
Top 5 earner in firm 0.48 0.51 0.24 0.33 0.48 0.49 0.25 0.32
Spouse is ASA board member 0 0.01 0.08 0.09 0 0.01 0.08 0.08
Post-appointment characteristics
Working more than 30 hours/week 0.75 0.72 0.8 0.72 0.75 0.75 0.8 0.72
Log of earnings 13.65 13.96 13.33 13.78 13.67 13.97 13.37 13.73
Earnings rank in cohort 89.66 90.7 86.37 88.82 90.26 90.95 87.24 88.17
Earnings ranking in cohort and degree 85.18 86.09 80.63 83.38 85.65 86.6 82.09 82.97
Earnings rank in cohort/degree>90th 
percentile
0.67 0.69 0.52 0.59 0.68 0.69 0.54 0.58
Married 0.81 0.8 0.65 0.68 0.81 0.79 0.65 0.67
Has kids 0.87 0.9 0.75 0.83 0.87 0.88 0.74 0.82
Number of kids 1.88 2.03 1.48 1.65 1.87 2 1.46 1.62
Spouse is ASA board member 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.06
N observations (board position*year) 10388 6888 799 3094 9493 7072 728 2425
  N individuals 3180 2274 342 945 2788 2065 294 731
Table 1: Characteristics of Board Members in firms covered by Legislation
Male














1 2 3 4
Panel A: ASA firm
Female -0.297*** -0.252*** -0.384*** -0.276***
[0.060] [0.043] [0.056] [0.038]
Male mean 13.65 13.96
Female mean 13.33 13.78
 N females 796 3075
N 11,065 9,913 11,065 9,913
N boards 638 571 638 571
Panel B: ASA in 2003
Female -0.283*** -0.282*** -0.384*** -0.318***
[0.064] [0.045] [0.060] [0.040]
1998-2003 Male mean 13.67 13.97
1998-2003 Female mean 13.37 13.73
1998-2003 N women 726 2410
N 10,115 9,433 10,115 9,433
N boards 473 373 473 373
No Board FE Board FE
Table 2: Gender Gaps in Earnings among Board members 1998-2010
Sample includes all individuals observed serving in ASA boards (panel A) or serving in 
boards of firms that were ASA in 2003 (panel B). Standard errors [in brackets] clustered 
at the individual level. Regression includes controls for age, age squared, experience, 










Log of annual earnings Women 0.0444*** 0.0298*** 0.0940*** 0.0784***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.025] [0.017]
Men 0.00911*** 0.00572*** 0.0468*** 0.101***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.013] [0.016]
Top 5 earner in firm Women 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.0322* 0.0260**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.017] [0.011]
Men 0.145*** 0.155*** 0.0287*** 0.0228***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.007] [0.008]
Observations for women 549,152 628,390 7,548 8,878
Observations for men 1,583,471 1,750,024 28,582 30,501
Table 3: Effect of being board member on labor market outcomes. 
Sample includes all individuals ever observed serving on AS or ASA Boards
Each coefficient comes from a separate regression by gender and time period.Specification 
includes age, age squared, experience, experience squared, year dummies and individual fixed 
effects. Standard errors [in brackets] are clustered at the person level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1
ASA FirmsALL firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable:
Percent Women on Boardt -0.0291 -0.0316 -0.0111** -0.0106** -0.00948 -0.00980 0.00227 -0.000399
[0.046] [0.047] [0.005] [0.005] [0.031] [0.032] [0.015] [0.015]
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects*Year Trend No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 763,454 763,454 754,223 754,223 763,454 763,454 763,451 763,451
R-squared 0.095 0.095 0.008 0.008 0.065 0.065 0.055 0.055
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable:
Percent Women on Boardt -0.0320 -0.0324 -0.0117* -0.0102 -0.00988 -0.0106 0.00405 0.0129
[0.039] [0.040] [0.007] [0.007] [0.025] [0.026] [0.025] [0.025]
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects*Year Trend No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 731,696 731,696 723,067 723,067 731,696 731,696 731,693 731,693
R-squared 0.112 0.112 0.010 0.010 0.067 0.067 0.095 0.095
Table 4: Effect of Board Gender Quota on Female Representation in ASA Groups
Panel A: Treated ASA Business Groups
Instrumental Variable Regressions
woman woman with an MBA woman with kid woman working part-time
Employee is a…
Note: Sample includes all individuals working in a treated ASA group (Panel A) or intent-to-treat ASA group (Panel B). "Percent Women on 
Board" is the percentage of women on a board of a given parent firm in a given year; it is instrumented for by the percentage of women on a 
board in 2003 interacted with year dummies. Appendix Table reports first stage regressions. Industry fixed effects correspond to 20 industry 
categories. Standard errors are clustered at the ultimate parent firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Panel B: Intent-to-Treat ASA Business Groups
Employee is…
woman woman with an MBA woman with kid woman working part-time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Subsample:
Dependent Variable:
Percent Women on Boardt 0.000320 0.000328 0.000407 0.00910* 0.00936** 0.00957** 0.000479 0.000584 0.000692 0.00860* 0.00899* 0.00890*
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects*Year Trend No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 230,946 230,946 228,450 230,946 230,946 228,450 161,747 161,747 161,114 161,747 161,747 161,114
R-squared 0.174 0.174 0.176 0.289 0.294 0.297 0.201 0.201 0.202 0.319 0.325 0.328
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Subsample:
Dependent Variable:
Percent Women on Boardt 0.00216 0.00282 0.00348* 0.0120* 0.0115 0.0130* 0.00325 0.00465 0.00488* 0.0224** 0.0221** 0.0226**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects*Year Trend No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 215,133 215,133 212,283 215,133 215,133 212,283 147,344 147,344 146,516 147,344 147,344 146,516
R-squared 0.119 0.120 0.122 0.250 0.251 0.255 0.140 0.141 0.141 0.278 0.279 0.283
I(Top 1 earner in group and year) I(Top 5 earner in group and year)
Table 5: Effect of Board Gender Quota on Female Representation in Top Earnings Positions
Instrumental Variable Regressions
Panel A: Individuals Employed in Treated ASA Business Groups
Note: Sample includes all women working in a treated ASA group (Panel A) or intent-to-treat ASA group (Panel B). "Percent Women on Board" is the percentage of women on a board of a given 
parent firm in a given year; it is instrumented for by the percentage of women on a board in 2003 interacted with year dummies. Appendix Table reports first stage regressions. Industry fixed effects 
correspond to 20 industry categories. Individual controls include: quadratic in age, education dummies, marital status dummy, kid dummy. Standard errors are clustered at the ultimate parent firm 
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Females Females with kids
I(Top 1 earner in group and year) I(Top 1 earner in group and year)I(Top 5 earner in group and year) I(Top 5 earner in group and year)
Females Females with kids
I(Top 1 earner in group and year)
Panel B: Individuals Employed in Intent-to-Treat ASA Business Groups
I(Top 5 earner in group and year)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Subsample:
Dependent Variable:
Percent Women on Boardt -0.0627***-0.0592*** -0.0267 -0.0258*** -0.0267*** -0.0140 -0.00322 -0.00594 0.00149
[0.021] [0.021] [0.027] [0.010] [0.010] [0.014] [0.007] [0.007] [0.009]
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects*Year Trend No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 230,941 230,941 228,445 230,941 230,941 228,445 230,941 230,941 228,445
R-squared 0.013 0.013 0.140 0.007 0.007 0.068 0.006 0.006 0.037
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Subsample:
Dependent Variable:
Percent Women on Boardt -0.0811*** -0.0704** -0.0379 -0.0330** -0.0309** -0.0174 -0.00873 -0.00658 0.00193
[0.025] [0.028] [0.041] [0.014] [0.014] [0.025] [0.008] [0.009] [0.012]
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects*Year Trend No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 215,123 215,123 212,273 215,123 215,123 212,273 215,123 215,123 212,273
R-squared 0.019 0.019 0.141 0.009 0.009 0.072 0.007 0.007 0.039
Quartile Decile Vigintile
Note: Sample includes all women working in a treated ASA group (Panel A) or intent-to-treat ASA group (Panel B). "Percent Women on 
Board" is the percentage of women on a board of a given parent firm in a given year; it is instrumented for by the percentage of women on a 
board in 2003 interacted with year dummies. Appendix Table reports first stage regressions. Industry fixed effects correspond to 20 industry 
categories. Individual controls include: quadratic in age, education dummies, marital status dummy, kid dummy. Standard errors are clustered 
at the ultimate parent firm level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Panel B: Individuals Employed in Intent-to-Treat ASA Business Groups
Females
Employee's earnings in top …. of business group's earnings distribution (Y=1):
Quartile Decile Vigintile
Employee's earnings in top …. of business group's earnings distribution (Y=1):
Table 6: Effect of Board Gender Quota on Female Outcomes in ASA Groups
Instrumental Variable Regressions
Panel A: Individuals Employed in Treated ASA Business Groups
Females
Sample
Affected group: Pscore>99.5 P98 & bus Pscore>99.5 P98 & bus Pscore>99.5 P98 & bus
Panel A: Basic Specification
Female*(2004-2010) 0.0124 0.0301 -0.0160 -0.0292 0.00315 -0.0371
[0.035] [0.050] [0.036] [0.055] [0.046] [0.069]
Female*(1992-1998) 0.00644 0.0391 0.0489 0.0704 0.0532 0.0234
[0.052] [0.082] [0.052] [0.090] [0.072] [0.142]
Female -0.129*** -0.132*** -0.157*** -0.134*** -0.153*** -0.111**
[0.032] [0.041] [0.031] [0.044] [0.041] [0.055]
1998-2003 Male mean 13.71 13.73 13.66 13.68 13.69 13.71
1998-2003 Female mean 13.51 13.57 13.43 13.52 13.47 13.58
1998-2003 N women 2002 802 1735 664 704 266
N 110,375 44,934 97,405 38,153 37,684 14,817
% obs from women 0.0729 0.0680 0.0680 0.0622 0.0709 0.0622
Panel B: controlling for lagged Y
Female*(2004-2010) 0.00357 -0.000912 -0.00334 -0.0233 0.00484 -0.0393
[0.015] [0.023] [0.015] [0.026] [0.022] [0.034]
Female*(1992-1998) -0.00656 -0.0122 0.0132 0.00130 -0.00383 -0.0628
[0.021] [0.038] [0.022] [0.042] [0.039] [0.069]
Female -0.0373*** -0.0297 -0.0528*** -0.0352* -0.0417** -0.00154
[0.013] [0.019] [0.013] [0.021] [0.020] [0.028]
1998-2003 Male mean 13.71 13.73 13.66 13.68 13.69 13.71
1998-2003 Female mean 13.51 13.57 13.43 13.52 13.47 13.58
1998-2003 N women 2002 802 1735 664 704 266
N 110,028 44,817 97,089 38,046 37,509 14,754
% obs from women 0.0729 0.0680 0.0680 0.0622 0.0709 0.0622
Table 7: Gender Gaps in Earnings among Top Business Earners, Ages 35-55.                                 





Last three years only
The regressions also control for year dummies, age,  age squared, potential experience dummies, and fixed individual 
characteristics (an indicator for whether the individual was working at the time of selection into his or her cohort, as well 
as marital status and presence of children at the time the individual was selected into his or her cohort).  Standard errors 
[in brackets] clustered at the person level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Affected labor market group: Pscore>99.5 P98 & bus Pscore>99.5 P98 & bus Pscore>99.5 P98 & bus
Panel A: Basic Specification
Female*(2004-2010) -0.0520** -0.0481 -0.0649*** -0.0614 -0.0639** -0.0135
[0.023] [0.038] [0.025] [0.042] [0.032] [0.056]
Female*(1992-1998) 0.0757*** 0.0742** 0.0765*** 0.0880** 0.0721** 0.111**
[0.023] [0.034] [0.023] [0.037] [0.029] [0.049]
Female -0.0580*** -0.0680** -0.0628*** -0.0863** -0.0632** -0.109**
[0.020] [0.033] [0.021] [0.036] [0.028] [0.048]
1998-2003 Male mean 0.362 0.464 0.339 0.438 0.393 0.514
1998-2003 Female mean 0.299 0.384 0.275 0.345 0.330 0.396
1998-2003 N women 2026 810 1759 672 719 270
N 111,224 45,232 98,183 38,415 38,093 14,968
% obs from women 0.0729 0.0680 0.0680 0.0622 0.0709 0.0622
Panel B: controlling for lagged Y
Female*(2004-2010) 9.49e-05 -0.00156 -0.00466 -0.00384 -0.0209* -0.00502
[0.009] [0.015] [0.010] [0.017] [0.012] [0.022]
Female*(1992-1998) 0.0284*** 0.0306** 0.0274*** 0.0351** 0.0138 0.0209
[0.009] [0.014] [0.009] [0.015] [0.011] [0.018]
Female -0.0227*** -0.0292** -0.0227*** -0.0355** -0.00882 -0.0218
[0.008] [0.014] [0.008] [0.015] [0.011] [0.018]
1998-2003 Male mean 0.362 0.464 0.339 0.438 0.393 0.514
1998-2003 Female mean 0.299 0.384 0.275 0.345 0.330 0.396
1998-2003 N women 2026 810 1759 672 719 270
N 111,223 45,232 98,182 38,415 38,093 14,968
% obs from women 0.0729 0.0680 0.0680 0.0622 0.0709 0.0622
Table 8: Gender Gaps in Representation in Top Positions within Firms, Ages 35-55.                             
Dependent variable: I(Top 5 earner in firm and year)
All Dropping Board Members
Dropping Board Members--
Last three years only
The regressions also control for year dummies, age,  age squared, potential experience dummies, and fixed individual 
characteristics (an indicator for whether the individual was working at the time of selection into his or her cohort, as well as 
marital status and presence of children at the time the individual was selected into his or her cohort).  Standard errors [in 
brackets] clustered at the person level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Sample:








Female*(2004-2010) -0.0135 0.00336 0.0184 0.0189
[0.019] [0.012] [0.023] [0.014]
Female*(1992-1998) 0.0825*** 0.0588*** 0.0782** 0.0606***
[0.026] [0.016] [0.032] [0.019]
Female -0.223*** -0.273*** -0.307*** -0.337***
[0.015] [0.009] [0.019] [0.011]
N 75,495 151,003 32,041 64,182
Table 9: Gender Gaps in (Log) Earnings Among Cohorts of Recent Graduates
Recent Graduate Degree
Recent Graduate Degree--































Table 10:  Awareness, Attitudes, and Expectations of Business Students, Fall 2013
Are You Aware of the Board Gender Quota Law?
Yes
Impact on Earnings 10 Years After Graduation?
Increased
Decreased
Impact on Likelihood of Attaining Top 5 Executive Position
Increased
Decreased





Likely Impact on Women in Business?
Good for Women in Business
Bad for Women in Business
Impact on Desired Number of Children
Increased 0
Year
N of ASA 
firms

















of Women on 
Board
Median Number 






2002 567 507 485 0.06 0.00 0.33 0 5.25 5
2003 563 563 463 0.07 0.00 0.38 0 5.22 5
2004 570 528 472 0.10 0.00 0.53 0 5.26 5
2005 453 346 436 0.17 0.17 0.98 1 5.43 5
2006 453 296 438 0.23 0.25 1.30 1 5.42 5
2007 423 214 420 0.36 0.40 1.94 2 5.34 5
2008 367 179 364 0.40 0.40 2.18 2 5.45 5
2009 321 157 310 0.40 0.40 2.13 2 5.54 5
2010 279 126 275 0.40 0.40 2.10 2 5.33 5
Appendix Table A1:  ASA Firms
Year
N of ASA parents, 
conditional on ASA 
in 2003
N of ASA parents, 
conditional of ASA in 






Total number of 
firms (parents and 
affiliates)
Mean corporate layer 
(0=ultimate parent; 
1=ultimate parent owns 
50% or more; etc)
2002 371 316 0.06 0 3320 1.55
2003 381 324 0.07 0 3386 1.54
2004 340 302 0.10 0 3439 1.66
2005 229 219 0.18 0.2 1783 1.59
2006 201 190 0.24 0.25 1589 1.63
2007 154 152 0.35 0.4 1518 1.73
2008 133 133 0.41 0.4 1542 1.81
2009 114 113 0.40 0.4 1408 1.85
2010 94 92 0.41 0.4 1255 1.89
Year
N of parents, 
conditional on ASA 
in 2003
N of parents, conditional 






Total number of 
firms (parents and 
affiliates)
Mean corporate layer 
(0=ultimate parent; 
1=ultimate parent owns 
50% or more; etc)
2002 365 308 0.06 0.00 3115 1.57
2003 381 324 0.07 0.00 3386 1.54
2004 374 332 0.10 0.00 3482 1.69
2005 297 291 0.16 0.17 1716 1.59
2006 290 277 0.20 0.20 1592 1.63
2007 267 264 0.25 0.33 1384 1.69
2008 259 255 0.28 0.33 1346 1.72
2009 252 247 0.27 0.33 1259 1.75
2010 246 237 0.26 0.33 1117 1.80
Notes: statistics reported in columns 3 to 6 are based on the subsample in column 2 with non-missing board data.
Appendix Table A2: ASA Parents and Business Groups: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: "Treated" Sample
Panel B: "Intent-to-Treat" Sample
Sample:
Unit of analysis:
2004 Dummy -0.310*** -0.334*** -0.0839* -0.0849* -0.219** -0.226** -0.0715 -0.0829*
[0.099] [0.102] [0.050] [0.051] [0.104] [0.104] [0.045] [0.046]
2005 Dummy -0.529*** -0.549*** -0.261*** -0.250*** -0.540*** -0.555*** -0.306*** -0.318***
[0.112] [0.113] [0.074] [0.076] [0.108] [0.109] [0.072] [0.073]
2006 Dummy -0.452*** -0.471*** -0.370*** -0.357*** -0.394*** -0.413*** -0.480*** -0.492***
[0.109] [0.110] [0.084] [0.086] [0.106] [0.110] [0.088] [0.089]
2007 Dummy -0.823*** -0.844*** -0.710*** -0.707*** -0.646*** -0.666*** -0.657*** -0.677***
[0.096] [0.097] [0.078] [0.080] [0.083] [0.086] [0.098] [0.099]
2008 Dummy -0.957*** -0.983*** -0.791*** -0.777*** -0.766*** -0.797*** -0.670*** -0.688***
[0.079] [0.080] [0.072] [0.076] [0.073] [0.086] [0.104] [0.108]
2009 Dummy -0.973*** -1.006*** -0.747*** -0.740*** -0.761*** -0.804*** -0.682*** -0.719***
[0.092] [0.094] [0.076] [0.079] [0.096] [0.110] [0.112] [0.115]
2010 Dummy -1.162*** -1.200*** -0.739*** -0.736*** -0.813*** -0.855*** -0.584*** -0.625***
[0.120] [0.117] [0.111] [0.115] [0.134] [0.131] [0.129] [0.132]
2004 Dummy 0.0683*** 0.0761*** 0.0339*** 0.0336*** 0.0635*** 0.0653*** 0.0301*** 0.0328***
[0.017] [0.018] [0.007] [0.007] [0.017] [0.016] [0.006] [0.006]
2005 Dummy 0.182*** 0.189*** 0.110*** 0.107*** 0.176*** 0.180*** 0.102*** 0.105***
[0.025] [0.025] [0.013] [0.013] [0.021] [0.021] [0.010] [0.011]
2006 Dummy 0.211*** 0.217*** 0.173*** 0.170*** 0.176*** 0.181*** 0.153*** 0.157***
[0.022] [0.022] [0.016] [0.017] [0.023] [0.025] [0.013] [0.013]
2007 Dummy 0.328*** 0.334*** 0.312*** 0.310*** 0.258*** 0.263*** 0.225*** 0.231***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.017] [0.018] [0.024] [0.026] [0.016] [0.016]
2008 Dummy 0.371*** 0.379*** 0.373*** 0.369*** 0.290*** 0.299*** 0.252*** 0.257***
[0.017] [0.017] [0.011] [0.012] [0.024] [0.029] [0.016] [0.017]
2009 Dummy 0.371*** 0.382*** 0.364*** 0.361*** 0.272*** 0.286*** 0.240*** 0.249***
[0.018] [0.019] [0.012] [0.013] [0.027] [0.033] [0.016] [0.017]
2010 Dummy 0.430*** 0.442*** 0.374*** 0.373*** 0.271*** 0.284*** 0.222*** 0.232***
[0.033] [0.034] [0.021] [0.022] [0.042] [0.044] [0.018] [0.019]
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects*Year Tren No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 763,454 763,454 1,368 1,368 731,696 731,696 1,942 1,942
R-squared 0.836 0.839 0.833 0.834 0.715 0.720 0.681 0.687
Note: Industry fixed effects correspond to 20 industry categories. Standard errors are clustered at the parent company level. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Appendix Table 3: First-Stage Regressions
Dependent Variable: Percentage Women on Board
Treated Intent-to-Treat
Individual Parent Company Individual Parent Company
Pct Women on Board in 2003*:
Sample
Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Female 0.297 0.457
Age 42.590 10.980 42.143 10.892 42.779 11.011
MBA (Y=1) 0.039 0.194 0.040 0.197 0.039 0.193
Kid(Y=1) 0.697 0.460 0.700 0.458 0.695 0.460
Working part-time 0.070 0.255 0.142 0.349 0.039 0.195
Earnings above Xth pcile in group and year:
50th 0.500 0.500 0.302 0.459 0.583 0.493
75th 0.250 0.433 0.113 0.317 0.308 0.462
90th 0.101 0.301 0.036 0.186 0.128 0.334
95th 0.051 0.220 0.016 0.125 0.066 0.247
Top 1 earner in group and year (Y=1) 0.0018 0.0425 0.0003 0.0163 0.0025 0.0496
Top 5 earner in group and year (Y=1) 0.008 0.092 0.002 0.048 0.011 0.105
Note: Reported in the table are summary statistics for individuals employed in treated ASA business groups between 2003 and 
2010.
All Females Males
Appendix Table 4: Summary Statistics : Employees of ASA firms (2003-2010)
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